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ON THE COMPATIBILITY O F  GESTALT LINGUISTICS 
AND STRATIFICATIONAL GRAMMAR 
by William M. Christie, Jr. 
This essay had its origins in a question put to  me some time back by Uhlan 
Slagle. Referring to  his own work (Slagle and Anttila Ms.: references) in 
Gestalt psychology, as well as to my own in stratificational grammar, he 
asked if I had done anything toward resolving the basic incompatibility of the 
two. The question has occupied me off and on since then, but the recent 
prominence that Gestalt linguistics has taken (for example, Anttila [1977]) as 
an alternative to the reductionism of the vast majority of the current approaches 
to linguistics has brought the problem a fresh immediacy. This collection 
seems a particularly appropriate place to  review the question and attempt an  
answer, for the growing and simultaneous interest in both Gestalt linguistics 
and stratificational grammar would make it particularly unfortunate if a 
basic incompatibility held the two apart. 
While Gestalt linguistics finds its foundation in certain principles of 
Gestalt psychology, it is not tied t o  it in all details. As Slagle (1975) has 
acknowledged, Gestalt psychology is defective in certain details and cannot 
be totally accepted in its original form. Because of the differences between the 
two, then, it seems best to  note the relationship in passing and proceed to an  
independent description of the basic principles of Gestalt linguistics. 
The characteristic that most dearly sets Gestalt linguistics off from other, 
reductionist varieties is its treatment of the object under investigation as a 
unity, a whole that is not merely an aggregate of ordered or unordered parts. 
Indeed, even the recognition of parts is not essential in a gestaltist framework. 
What are in other models treated as parts can in Gestalt linguistics be regarded 
as nothing more than qualities of the whole that are abstracted for purposes of 
discussion. An enumeration of these qualities does not exhaust the object under 
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description, for the coherence of these qualities in a total pattern transcends the 
mere aggregate of them. In the gestaltist view, then, to use a hackneyed phrase, 
the whole is greater than the sum of its Parts. 
There is another aspect of Gestalt linguistics that also needs mention. Any 
object under investigation may itself be regarded as an abstraction from the 
totality in which it occurs. Any utterance that is a text will itself be situationally 
contextuaIized, Note here the distinction between utterance and text, the latter 
being a special case of the former. An utterance can be anything at all produced 
by the natural human communicative apparatus or its instruments, incIuding 
natural speech, computer-produced "poetry," and even isolated sentences 
concocted by linguists to be their objects of study. A text, on the other hand, is a 
naturally occurring contextualized utterance. All texts are therefore utterances, 
but not all utterances are texts. One should note, however, that an utterance that 
is not a text can become one on proper contextualization and use. Chomsky's 
famous Colorless green ideas sleep furiotu!,~ started life as an  utterance but 
not as a text. Upon contextualization in a poem, however, it became a text. Now 
if we accept what I regard as a quite unexceptionable position, namely Firth's 
treatment of meaning (Firth 1935), we find that it follows from the foregoing 
discussion that only texts have meaning, and that their meaning depends on the 
context. This fact, of course, explains how Chomsky's sentence can have been 
considered meaningless when originally produced, but meaningful after its use 
in a poem. Furthermore, it must follow that Chomskyk sentence is merely a 
particularly obvious case, and that any sentence artificially concocted by a 
linguist must be regarded as meaningless unless there is associated with it some 
actual, implied, or at least potential context, which can give it meaning. In these 
terms, then, a text can be seen as an abstracted property of the total situation in 
which it occurs. And since the text acquires meaning as a result of contextual- 
ization, the gestaltist approach requires a field method for the description of 
semantics. 
With the mention of Firth and the choice of the field approach for semantics, 
we might be tempted to make the Firthian extension of the notion of semantics 
and require a field approach to a11 of language description. Such an extension 
is not necessary, however, if we follow Halliday and Lamb (1973) and draw a 
distinction between internal and external grammar. The extension of the term 
"grammar" to the study of external relations is perhaps unfortunate, for it is just 
internal grammar, so called, that is the traditional range for grammar (without 
modifiers). A reference to external grammar might well lead to an unfortunate 
and inappropriate extension of the methods of internal grammar to  external 
description, or vice versa. It is just such an  extension that has been one of the 
major problems with transformational grammar as it has been practiced. This 
matter is treated in Robinson (1975). Now quite clearly the social structure of 
external grammar is the proper realm for a field description, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the field will be required for internal description. Some 
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other models may be appropriate here, provided they are compatible with the 
description of the external relations. I do  not propose to explore this matter in 
detail here, as I have explicated the various relationships elsewhere (Christie 
1980). But we will return to the matter later when we examine the way in which 
stratificational grammar can be integrated into a gestaltist framework. 
I 1  
In the foregoing discussion, certain points may have sounded so much like 
a stratificational description that it may be wise to  point out exactly where 
stratificational grammar is perceived to be incompatible with Gestalt linguistics. 
Let us take as a point of departure the most obvious similarity, the gestaltist 
potential for treating entities not as real things but as abstractions from a 
totality. This sounds remarkably like the stratificational principle, taken 
directly from Hjelmslev, that a totality consists not of things but of relations. 
The by now classic treatment of g o  is a good illustration. 
Sydney Lamb has liked to begin this illustration by writing "GO" on a 
blackboard and asking what we know about it. The properties listed were 
tvf 
more o r  less these: Go has two alternant forms, /go /  and '"/wend/. 
consists of two morphophonemes, g and o, the latter having two phonemic 
Zvl 
realizations, /a w/ prepausally, / 31 elsewhere. /wend/ ,  which occurs only 
with the preterite morpheme, falls into the same class as send and lend, 
conditioning a special preterite allomorph. One could also trace down to the 
features of the phonemes and exhaust the description in this direction. Go 
occurs in isolation, but also in combinations, such as with under andJore. For 
all these there are various syntactic and semantic combinations that can be 
traced out in this direction. The result might look something like figure I .  
When the diagram was completed, Lamb would step back and ask, "Now 
does this diagram tell us everything we know about GO?" Upon receiving 
an affirmative answer, he would erase GO, connect the ends of the lines, and 
point out that since no connections were lost by the erasure, no information 
about G O  was lost. G O  itself, then, was nothing more than the sum of these 
connections. The "real thing" G O  evaporated and became nothing more than 
a location in a relational network. It would appear that stratificational 
grammar has effectively eliminated the atoms of the reductionist approach, 
and thus has achieved a goal of Gestalt linguistics. 
In fact, however, stratificational grammar has substituted one set ofatoms 
for another. The various relationships have become the new atoms of a new 
sort of reductionist description, even when they are not reified by some 
attempt to  connect a stratificational network with a human neural net. The 
essence of the problem is that GOis regarded as  the totality of its connections. 
Substitute "the whole" for "GO," "sum" for "totality," and "partswfor "con- 
nections," and you have the very antithesis of the gestaltist position. Of course, 
the question very naturaIly arises, what could be missing from a description 
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meaning of meaning of meaning o f  
undergo  f o r e g o  - i? 0 
s y n t a c t i c  
c o n n e c t i o n s  
that enumerates all the connections of GO? The answer lies in use, in the way 
speakers actualIy use the word, in its associations, in what Firth calls its 
collocations, the company it keeps, all of which is outside the realm of a 
purely internal grammatical description, and all of which contributes to the 
indivisible totality from which characteristics may be abstracted. Stratifica- 
tional grammar, then, turns out to be quite an unusual reductionist model, but 
reductionist nonetheless. To find a way to make such a model compatible with 
Gestalt linguistics, we must return to  the gestaltist position and examine it in a 
bit more detail. 
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At the end of section I, I mentioned that a field approach to the description 
of semantics, which means a description of language use, did not necessarily 
imply the need for a field approach to internal grammar. To see how this is 
so, we need to consider two general matters of linguisticdescription. The first 
matter concerns Householder's famous distinction between God's-truth 
linguistics and hocus-pocus linguistics. This issue revolves around two related 
questions. First, is structure innate in speech or is it imposed by the linguist? 
Second, is there only one correct analysis for linguistic problems, if we could 
find it?' The God's-truth linguist will answer that structure is innate in speech, 
and that there is therefore only one correct analysis. It is the duty of the linguist 
to discover that innate structure and with it the correct analysis. The hocus- 
pocus linguist will answer that structure is imposed by the linguist, and that 
there is therefore no one correct analysis. Each analysis is to be judged inde- 
pendently in terms of its own purpose and utility. In recent years this debate has 
been little noticed, and most linguists have thought of the question so little that 
they would be hard put to describe themselves. Yet the practice and mode of 
debate that has characterized recent linguistics has made it clear that most 
practicing linguists today are quite definitely out to discover God's truth. This is 
certainly true of the transformationalists in their practice, and the tendency 
toward a God's-truth approach can also be discerned in the work of many 
stratificationalists. But currently practicing Gestalt linguists appear to take the 
hocus-pocus approach to linguistics, and it is this attitude that makes possible 
an analysis under which Gestalt linguistics and stratificational grammar can be 
made compatible. To see how this is done, we must turn to the second of our 
general matters of linguistic description, the construction of linguistic models, 
Kenneth Pike (1959) has offered quite a useful typology of linguistic models 
using particle, wave, and field descriptions. The three may be characterized 
briefly as follows: The particle description is our classical reductionist model. 
There are entities to be defined, and the various arrangements of these entities 
compose the structure of the object under investigation. Pike is, of course, 
borrowing his classification from physics, and the particle model of light is his 
obvious point of comparison. The wave model of light is equally clearly the 
point of comparison for the wave model, although the application of such a 
model in linguistics may not be so clear. One area of linguistics particularly 
suited to  such a description would be the physical acoustics of speech, the 
dynamics of formant structure, transitions, bursts, band-limited noise, and the 
like. The field model needs little explanation, as it is very much like what we 
have already discussed as the approach required in certain parts of a gestaltist 
description. Now Pike in presenting this typology suggests that each approach 
has its particular merits. Each can throw a certain light on the data being 
examined, and so each should be exploited for whatever it can offer a linguistic 
anaIysis. From this it is a very simple and natural step to suggest that different 
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aspects of the total phenomenon of language can best be described by different 
models, that no one model is best for the whole of language, and that an optimal 
description of language will have to be multi-modal. Such a position is in no 
way incompatible with Gestalt linguistics, and, indeed, at least one gestaltist 
(Anttila 1977) has explicitly made a very similar suggestion. This being so, it 
follows that the gestaltist preference for a field approach in the description of 
external grammar, and also perhaps as an integrative framework to tie together 
all the various kinds of linguistic descriptions, in no way requires that that 
same approach be used for every part of language. In particular, it is entireIy 
possible that a particle or wave approach might be much better for a description 
of internal grammar. 
We arrive now at the final stage of our investigation, the point at which we 
must ask how the various models are to be integrated. For internal grammar 
there seems to  be no objection to the use of a stratificational-type particle 
model. While its adequacy has occasionally been questioned, the challenges 
have been met without great difficulty (Reich and Dell 1977; Christie 1976; 
and references in the two articles). A stratificational grammar, then, describes 
the structure of a language, taking that term in the Praguian sense. But a 
description of the structure alone tells us rather little about the language as a 
whole. What is needed is a description of how that structure is used by a native 
speakerlhearer, a real human being. This use is best modeled by a field 
description of a gestaltist type, and the only requirement that we need to  
impose on our various descriptions is that they not be incompatible; that is, 
the description of the internal grammar must not be of a type that could not 
possibly be put into use, and the description of the external grammar must not 
be of a type that could not integrate and make use of structure. This require- 
ment, be it noted, as  simple as it is, is by no means trivial. Indeed, it is the failure 
to meet this requirement that most strongly disqualifies transformational 
grammar as a possible internal description. What emerges from this, then, is a 
description of language that is complex and diverse, yet in certain ways inte- 
grated. A field approach will hold together the description of the external 
grammar, which will certainly be gestaltist, and the description of the internal 
grammar, which will be reductionist, but of the stratificational variety. When 
one adopts a multi-modal, hocus-pocus approach to language description, the 
alleged incompatibility of Gestalt linguistics and stratificational grammar 
vanishes completely. 
COMPATIBILITY OF GESTALT LINGUISTICS 
NOTE 
1 I have adapted these questions from Kenneth L. Pike and Eunice V. Pike (1955) It is inter- 
esting to note that at the time this was publ~shed, Pike seemed to regard himself as  being on the 
God's-truth side ofthe matter (see the references to hisown work In sections 1. I and 1.2). By 1959, 
however, Pike seemed to be leaning more towards something l ~ k e  the hocus-pocus position (Pike 
1959). 
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